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Abstract 
Sell-side equity analysts often work in hierarchical teams. Lead analysts manage a team of associate and 
junior analysts, who take part in the team’s tasks. We hypothesize a division of labor between lead and 
associate analysts where lead analysts focus on higher-importance tasks and delegate secondary tasks to 
their associates. We find that associate analyst fixed effects explain more of the variation in forecast 
accuracy than lead analyst fixed effects do. In contrast, lead analyst fixed effects explain more of the 
variation in forecast timeliness and in the stock price reaction to the analyst report. These results suggest 
that associate analysts have a significant role in forecasting while lead analysts are the main contributors 
to the qualitative information in the report. In cross-sectional tests, we find that lead analysts are more 
involved in the coverage of larger firms that likely generate more trading commissions to the brokerage 
house. We also document that lead analysts are more involved when more information processing is 
required and associate analysts are more involved as they gain experience. Overall, our study documents 
the division of labor between lead and associate analysts and the significant role of associate analysts in 
forecasting. 
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1. Introduction  
Sell-side equity analysts mostly work in hierarchical teams. The team is led by a lead 
analyst, who bears the overarching responsibility for the team’s performance. The lead analyst, 
in most cases, is the only team member observed on analyst estimates dissemination platforms 
such as I/B/E/S. Under the direction of the lead analyst, there is usually an associate analyst and, 
at times, additional junior analysts. The role of the lead analyst is to lead the team, provide the 
general guidelines and framework for the modeling, as well as communicate with clients and 
interact with the management within the brokerage house. Associate analysts are mostly 
responsible for the technical aspects of modeling, general research, and additional back-office 
tasks. As they gain experience, associate analysts may also communicate with clients (Bradshaw, 
Ertimur, and O’Brien 2017). Except for some anecdotal evidence, there is no empirical evidence 
on the contribution of associate analysts to the performance of the lead analyst and the division 
of labor between lead and associate analysts. In this study, we examine the relative contribution 
of lead and associate analysts to multiple forecast characteristics to understand the role of 
associate analysts in the production of earnings forecasts and analyst reports. 
We argue that lead analysts are time-constrained and therefore follow a ‘pecking order’ 
to prioritize their tasks. Bradshaw (2011) summarizes institutional investor rankings of traits they 
value in sells-side analysts. Within the ranked traits, industry knowledge persistently comes first, 
whereas earnings estimates generally come last. Given the low importance of earnings estimates 
to the most significant group of consumers of analyst outputs, we argue that lead analysts delegate 
the forecasting of earnings to their associate analysts. Institutional investor surveys also inform 
that written reports, timeliness, and communication skills are more important traits than earnings 
forecasts. We therefore hypothesize that lead analysts are more involved in those tasks.  
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Analyst estimates dissemination platforms, such as I/B/E/S, link estimates only to lead 
analysts. In contrast, analyst reports provide the names of all the authors that contributed to the 
report in the order of their contribution (see Appendix B for an illustration).1 The lead analyst 
appears first, followed by the associate analyst and the junior analysts (if they exist, as some 
analyst reports are sole-authored). We hand-collect the names of the associate analysts from the 
analyst reports. To make the data collection feasible, we randomly select two bulge bracket 
brokerage houses (J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns) and two additional brokerage houses 
(Oppenheimer and Buckingham). We then download all the analyst reports issued by the four 
brokerage houses for the period 2004-2014 from Thomson ONE (295,179 reports in total).2 Next, 
we augment the I/B/E/S database with the names of the associate analysts that contributed to each 
estimate.  
We employ a regression model that includes lead analyst and associate analyst fixed 
effects, in addition to a vector of control variables. We then decompose and allocate the total R2 
to the explanatory variables following Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Graham, Li, and Qiu 
(2012). We find that associate analysts explain 50 percent more of the variation in forecast 
accuracy than lead analysts do. Specifically, lead analyst fixed effects explain 12.96 percent of 
the total R2 while associate analyst fixed effects explain 19.44 percent of the total R2. Associate 
analysts’ involvement in EPS forecasting need not necessarily improve forecast accuracy, 
particularly if they are less skilled than lead analysts. Lead analysts perform a range of tasks. If 
                                                            
1 Analyst reports generally list the names of all those who contributed to the report. However, the lead analyst has 
discretion over which team members to list on the report. The lead analyst’s discretion can impose a limitation since 
it is possible that some sole-authored reports benefited from an associate analyst who did not receive recognition. 
However, only 18 percent of analyst reports in our sample are sole-authored and lead analysts that exclusively sole-
author throughout our sample period account for less than 3 percent of our sample, which suggests that this data 
limitation is not prevalent in our sample. 
2 Our hand-collected sample represents 7.67 percent of the I/B/E/S universe for our sample period. While the sample 
may appear small, the research assistants and we invested a total of approximately 1,500 hours to hand-collect the 
data. 
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EPS forecasting is not a primary objective of lead analysts, as multiple surveys suggest, lead 
analysts may allocate forecasting responsibilities to associate analysts so they can focus on higher 
order tasks while sacrificing forecast accuracy. However, if associate analysts are better than lead 
analysts at forecasting, then forecast accuracy may improve.3 We find significant variation in 
associate analyst fixed effects where some associate analysts improve forecast accuracy while 
others lower it.4 
We further examine whether associate analysts contribute to forecast timeliness. Forecast 
timeliness is an important quality factor for analysts (Clement and Tse 2003; Cooper, Day, and 
Lewis 2001). We find that lead analyst fixed effects explain 72.20 percent more of the variation 
in forecast timeliness than associate analyst fixed effects do. Specifically, lead analyst fixed 
effects explain 24.31 percent of the total R2 and associate analyst fixed effects explain 14.12 
percent of the total R2. These results suggest that the decision to write a report is at the discretion 
of the lead analyst. However, since associate analysts are heavily involved in writing the report 
and producing the estimates, they have a significant impact on forecast timeliness as well. These 
results also suggest that the stronger explanatory power of associate analysts compared to lead 
analysts in explaining the variation in forecast accuracy is not attributed to the larger number of 
associate analyst fixed effects. If the higher explanatory power of associate analyst fixed effects 
                                                            
3  When analysts cover specialized industries, like pharma and technology, sometimes the lead analyst has a 
specialized background (e.g., an engineering or M.D. degree) and limited finance or accounting knowledge. To 
compensate for the lead analyst’s deficiencies in finance and accounting, he may be matched with an associate analyst 
with finance or accounting background. 
4 In untabulated analyses, we remove the associate analyst fixed effects and introduce an indicator variable equal to 
1 if the report is co-authored, and zero otherwise. We find that the coefficient estimate on this indicator variable for 
forecast accuracy is negative (which implies that co-authored reports are more accurate), but statistically 
insignificant. We also observe statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for the co-authored report dummy 
variable for timeliness, stock price reaction, and abnormal trading volume. These results suggest that there are 
moderating factors for the association between the existence of an associate analyst on a report and forecast accuracy 
(i.e., the level of involvement of the associate analyst and the forecasting skills of the associate analyst relative to 
those of the lead analyst). 
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we observe for forecast accuracy was attributed to the larger number of associate analyst indicator 
variables, we would have expected to observe comparable results for timeliness. 
In addition to testing lead and associate analysts’ contribution to forecast accuracy and 
timeliness, we explore their impact on the qualitative information contained in analyst reports. 
Analyst reports contain qualitative information that, according to surveys, institutional investors 
value more than earnings estimates and prior studies found to be value relevant (Bradshaw 2011; 
De Franko, Hope, Vyas, and Zhou 2013; Huang, Zang, and Zheng 2014). We proxy for the 
qualitative information in analyst reports using the stock price reaction and abnormal trading 
volume associated with the analyst report and find that, controlling for the information embedded 
in the earnings estimate, lead analyst fixed effects explain 86.70 percent (190.90 percent) more 
of the variation in stock price reaction (abnormal trading volume) than associate analysts fixed 
effects do. These results suggest that lead analysts are more involved in the qualitative aspect of 
the report. However, we acknowledge that the lead analyst’s recognition and visibility could also 
explain the higher explanatory power of lead analyst fixed effects for stock price reaction and 
abnormal trading volume.  
We further hypothesize that lead analysts’ involvement in forecasting varies cross-
sectionally. A significant component of the revenue generated by sell-side analysts comes from 
trading commissions, and large stocks typically generate more trades. We therefore expect that 
lead analysts are more involved in the coverage of large firms. Consistent with our expectation, 
we find that the explanatory power of lead analyst fixed effects relative to that of associate analyst 
fixed effects for all our dependent variables (i.e., accuracy, timeliness, stock price reaction, and 
abnormal trading volume) is higher for large firms relative to small firms. 
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Clement (1999) finds that forecast accuracy improves with the lead analyst’s firm-specific 
experience, consistent with a learnings curve. Building on this finding, we postulate that lead 
analysts are more involved in the production of analyst reports at the initiation of coverage, when 
significant learning and information processing is required. Over time, as the forecasting models 
improve, we expect the lead analyst to delegate more duties to the associate. We therefore 
hypothesize that, all else equal, lead analysts’ involvement (relative to associate analysts) declines 
with their firm-specific experience. We find that the explanatory power of lead analyst fixed 
effects relative to that of associate analyst fixed effects for all our dependent variables declines 
with the lead analyst’s firm-specific experience.  
Lead analysts serve as mentors to associate analysts. Inexperienced associate analysts are 
generally tasked with technical assignments and are subject to more oversight by the lead analyst. 
As the associate analyst gains experience, the lead analyst typically delegates more 
responsibilities to the associate and reduces the level of oversight (Bradshaw et al. 2017). 
Therefore, holding all else equal, we expect the relative involvement of the lead analyst to decline 
with the associate analyst’s experience, and find consistent results.  
We also expect the relative contribution of lead and associate analysts to vary between the 
first and revised forecast in the quarter. The first forecast is defined as the first forecast following 
the earnings announcement for the previous quarter and the revised forecast is defined as any 
forecast revision made after the first forecast and before the earnings announcement for the 
current quarter. Firms use earnings announcements and the subsequent conference call to release 
new information that requires significant processing (Amiram, Owens, and Rozenbaum 2016). In 
addition, a significant portion of the annual trading volume and stock price changes occurs around 
earnings announcements (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010). Therefore, we expect and find 
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that the involvement of lead analysts in modeling EPS estimates is more pronounced for the first 
forecast in the quarter, which typically generates more trading volume and requires more 
information processing. 
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. While there are many studies on 
analyst characteristics, the process in which analysts turn inputs into estimates remains a “black 
box” (Bradshaw 2011; Ramnath, Rock, and Shame 2008; Brown, Call, Clement, and Sharp 2015). 
Our study sheds light on one area within that “black box” –associate analysts and the division of 
labor between lead and associate analysts. Most studies to date examine the performance of the 
analyst group and attribute it to the lead analyst (the studies by Brown and Hugon 2009; Brightbill 
2018; and Fang and Hope 2018 are exceptions). The focus on the lead analyst is not surprising 
given that information on associate analysts is not readily available. 5  Using approximately 
300,000 hand-collected analyst reports by all analysts within a random sample of four brokerage 
houses for the period 2004-2014, we document the significant impact of associate analysts on the 
performance of lead analysts and provide evidence on some of the circumstances where associate 
analysts matter more. Our study informs on a major debate in the analyst literature. Despite the 
extensive research on the determinants of forecast accuracy, it is still unclear whether forecast 
accuracy is a significant performance factor for analysts. On the one hand, Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis (1999) and Hong and Kubik (2003) find that low forecast accuracy is associated with 
                                                            
5 At times, multiple lead analysts collaborate to generate a report. Those instances are identified by I/B/E/S by 
including the names of more than one lead analyst or adding “et al.” to the first analyst’s name. Brown and Hugon 
(2009) find that forecast accuracy decreases and timeliness improves when multiple lead analysts collaborate. Our 
study is materially different from Brown and Hugon’s (2009) study since we define teams differently. We define the 
analyst team as the hierarchical team managed by a lead analyst whereas they capture collaborations of two or more 
lead analysts on an ad-hoc basis to write a report. Consequently, their team observations are not common and account 
for 6 percent of their overall sample. In contrast, our team observations, which capture the organic analyst team lead 
by a single lead analyst, account for 82 percent of our sample. Brightbill (2018) and Fang and Hope (2018) are recent 
studies that examine the association between analyst teams and forecast accuracy and find that forecasts produced 
by an analyst team are more accurate than forecasts that are sole-authored. In our study, we examine the division of 
labor between lead and associate analysts. However, in all our analyses we include an analyst team control variable. 
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analyst turnover. On the other hand, Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011) find that forecast 
accuracy is not associated with analysts’ compensation and Emery and Li (2009) do not find an 
association between star status and forecast accuracy. Similarly, surveys of analysts and 
institutional investors suggest that forecast accuracy is one of the least important objectives of 
analysts.6 Our study contributes to this debate by documenting that lead analysts delegate EPS 
forecasting to associate analysts. Therefore, while forecast accuracy may not be a first-order task 
for lead analysts, our findings suggest that it may be a first-order task for associate analysts. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
Overview 
Sell-side equity analysts have been the focus of extant research in accounting and finance. 
The vast research on analysts is attributed to two main reasons. First, analysts’ outputs are used 
extensively in accounting and finance as a proxy for market expectations (e.g., Bagnoli, Beneish, 
and Watts 1999; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki 2009; Rozenbaum 2017). The appeal of analyst 
forecasts comes from their superiority over time-series models (e.g., Brown and Rozeff 1978; 
Brown, Hagerman, Griffin, and Zmijewski 1987; O’Brien 1988). 7  Second, analyst outputs 
provide one of the few sources of archival data that allow researchers to examine how investors 
perform valuations of securities (Bradshaw 2004).  
Given the importance of analyst forecasts, a stream of literature examines the determinants 
of forecast accuracy. The determinants of forecast accuracy can be broadly divided into four 
                                                            
6 Bradshaw (2011) summarizes surveys of institutional investors on the value of various sell-side analyst attributes 
for the years 1998-2005. Earnings estimates consistently appear at the bottom of the ranking. Brown, Call, Clement, 
and Sharp (2016) find comparable results. Similarly, in a survey of sell-side analysts, Brown et al. (2015) find that 
forecast accuracy and timeliness have the lowest impact on sell-side analysts’ compensation. 
7 As an exception, Bradshaw, Drake, Myers, and Myers (2012) find that time-series models are superior to analyst 
forecasts over longer horizons and for smaller and younger firms. 
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groups: (1) firm complexity, (2) analyst characteristics, (3) resources, and (4) incentives. 8 
Bradshaw (2011) notes that among the various determinants of forecast accuracy, the process in 
which inputs are being processed and turned into EPS estimates remains a ‘black box’. Some 
studies explore specific components of the ‘black box’. For example, Hugon, Kumar, and Lin 
(2016) find that forecasts are more accurate when analysts work at brokerages with in-house 
macroeconomists. Han, Kong, and Liu (2017) document that analysts’ visits to the companies 
they cover improve their forecast accuracy. Cici, Shane, and Yang (2017) find that sell-side 
analysts’ connections with buy-side analysts improve forecast accuracy. Another component of 
‘black box’ is the analyst team, which is the focus of our study. 
Analyst teams 
Analysts mostly work in hierarchical teams. The team is led by one lead analyst, who 
bears the overarching responsibility for the team’s performance. The lead analyst, in most cases, 
is the only team member observed on analyst estimates dissemination platforms such as I/B/E/S. 
Under the direction of the lead analyst, there is usually an associate analyst and at times additional 
junior analysts. The role of the lead analyst is to lead the team, provide the general guidelines and 
framework for modeling, as well as communicate with clients and interact with the management 
within the brokerage house. Associate analysts are mostly responsible for the technical aspects of 
modeling, general research, and additional back-office tasks. With time, associate analysts may 
also communicate with clients (Bradshaw et al. 2017). 
We posit that lead analysts are time-constrained and therefore follow a ‘pecking order’ to 
delegate tasks to associate analysts. Lead analysts perform tasks that are of higher importance and 
                                                            
8 For a review of the literature, see Ramnath et al. 2008. 
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delegate less important tasks to their associates. Bradshaw (2011) summarizes institutional 
investor rankings of traits they value in sells-side analysts. Within the ranked traits, industry 
knowledge persistently comes first, whereas earnings estimates generally come last. Given the 
low importance of earnings estimates to the most significant group of consumers of analyst 
outputs, we hypothesize that lead analysts delegate the forecasting of earnings to their associate 
analysts. Consequently, we posit that associate analysts have a higher impact on forecast accuracy 
than lead analysts do. Our first hypothesis (stated in null form) is: 
Hypothesis 1: Associate analysts do not have a higher impact on forecast accuracy than lead 
analysts do. 
Institutional investor surveys also inform that written reports, timeliness, and 
communication skills are more important traits than earnings estimates. We therefore hypothesize 
that lead analysts are more involved in those tasks. We follow Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder (2007) 
to measure timeliness and use the stock price reaction to the analyst report and the abnormal 
trading volume it generates to proxy for the qualitative information in the analyst report. Our 
second hypothesis (stated in null form) is: 
Hypothesis 2: Associate analysts do not have a higher impact on the qualitative information 
in the analyst report and its timeliness than lead analysts do. 
Cross-sectional predictions 
The decision on the level of involvement of the lead analyst and the delegation of duties 
to the associate analyst lie with the lead analyst. We expect the extent of the delegation of duties 
to the associate analyst by the lead analyst to vary cross-sectionally. We, therefore, partition the 
sample in four dimensions to examine settings where lead analysts are expected to delegate more 
tasks that are related to the analyst report to the associate analyst. 
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Our theory of pecking order of analyst tasks predicts that lead analysts are more involved 
in tasks that are of higher importance. A major source of revenue for equity research departments 
at brokerage houses comes from trading commissions that they generate. Larger firms typically 
generate more trading volume. Therefore, holding all else equal, we predict that the relative 
involvement of lead analysts is higher for large firms compared to small firms. Our third 
hypothesis (stated in null form) is: 
Hypothesis 3: The involvement of lead analysts relative to associate analysts in generating 
analyst reports and earnings estimates is the same for large firms and small firms. 
The universe of firms covered by a given analyst changes over time. Analysts seek to 
identify firms that are undervalued and add them to their portfolio (Irvine 2003). When a firm is 
added to the portfolio, the analyst team needs to learn about the firm and build a model for 
forecasting. Over time, the model is tested and updated. We posit that, given the complexity of 
initiating coverage and producing an earnings model, lead analysts are greatly involved in this 
process. Over time, as the model improves and the slope of the learning curve declines, we 
hypothesize that the lead analyst will delegate more responsibilities to the associate analyst. Our 
fourth hypothesis (stated in null form) is: 
Hypothesis 4: The involvement of lead analysts relative to associate analysts in generating 
analyst reports and earnings estimates does not change with the lead analyst’s firm-specific 
experience. 
Associate analysts are the mentees of lead analysts. When an associate analyst is paired 
with a lead analyst, the associate analyst is mostly assigned technical tasks at the guidance and 
oversight of the lead analyst. Over time, the associate analyst is given more complex tasks and 
greater freedom (Bradshaw et al. 2017). Consequently, we hypothesize that the involvement of 
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the lead analyst relative to that of the associate analyst declines with the associate analyst’s firm-
specific experience. Our fifth hypothesis (stated in null form) is: 
Hypothesis 5: The involvement of lead analysts relative to associate analysts in generating 
analyst reports and earnings estimates does not change with the associate analyst’s firm-
specific experience. 
We also expect the relative contribution of lead analysts and associate analysts to vary 
between the first and revised forecast in the quarter. The first forecast is defined as the first 
forecast following the earnings announcement for the previous quarter and the revised forecast is 
defined as any forecast revision made after the first forecast and before the earnings 
announcement for the current quarter. Earnings announcements and the subsequent conference 
call contain significant new information that requires processing (Beyer et al. 2010). Furthermore, 
the information content of the first forecast in the quarter is larger than the information content of 
the revised forecast in the quarter (Amiram et al. 2016). Therefore, given the increased 
information processing necessary for generating the first forecast and the higher trading volume 
it generates, we expect the involvement of the lead analyst in producing the first forecast in the 
quarter to be more significant than his involvement in producing the revised forecast in the 
quarter. 
Hypothesis 6: The involvement of lead analysts relative to associate analysts in generating 
analyst reports and earnings estimates does not change between the first forecast in the 
quarter and the revised forecast. 
3. Research design 
Forecast accuracy model 
We follow Jacob, Lys, and Neale’s (1999) empirical model to test the relative contribution 
of lead and associate analysts to forecast accuracy: 
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RankedFEi,k,q,n = β1Horizoni,k,q,n + β2Freqi,k,q + β3LnFirmExperiencei,k,q,n + β4Speci,k,t 
 + β5Compi,t + β6Changei,k,q + β7B-Sizem,t + β8B-Indm,k,t  
 + β9PINm,t + β10POUTm,t + β11N_Associatei,k,q,n + τt + μk  
 + ωm + φi + ψj + εi,k,q,n                                                        (1) 
where i, k, q, and n, uniquely identify each observation as the nth estimate issued by analyst i for 
firm k’s fiscal quarter q.9 Subscript j denotes the associate analyst that assisted lead analyst i in 
producing the estimate; subscript m denotes the brokerage house that employed analyst i on the 
date of the estimate. Finally, subscript t denotes the calendar year of fiscal quarter q. 
RankedFEi,k,q.n is the percentile ranking of the absolute forecast error of analyst i’s nth EPS 
forecast for firm k’s fiscal quarter q.  
We employ the controls used by Jacob et al. (1999). Specifically, we control for the 
forecast horizon (Horizon) and forecast frequency (Freq). We also control for time-varying lead 
analyst characteristics: the lead analyst’s experience covering firm k (LnFirmExperience), 
industry specialization (Spec), and the number of firms followed by the lead analyst (Comp).10 
Moreover, we include controls for time-varying brokerage house characteristics: an indicator 
variable that is equal to one if there was a change of the lead analyst covering firm k at brokerage 
house m in quarter q, and zero otherwise (Change), brokerage house size (B-Size), and the industry 
specialization of the brokerage house (B-Ind). We also control for the change in the number of 
lead analysts employed by brokerage house m. We separately calculate the percentage of 
incoming lead analysts (PIN) and the percentage of lead analysts that leave the brokerage house 
(POUT) during year t. We further include the number of associate and junior analysts listed on 
                                                            
9 Jacob et al. (1999) restrict their sample to the last forecast by each analyst for a given firm-quarter. We use all 
forecasts made in the quarter to maintain a constant sample in our tests for all dependent variables (since the studies 
we follow to construct our timeliness measures employ all forecasts). Results are qualitatively unchanged when we 
restrict the sample to analysts’ last forecast for a given firm-quarter. 
10 Applying controls for time-varying lead analyst characteristics may bias the results in favor of associate analysts 
since we do not include comparable controls for associate analysts. The bias can arise because the effect of the 
missing associate analyst controls may be partially absorbed by the associate analyst fixed effects. Inferences are 
unchanged when we exclude both the lead and associate analyst time-varying controls. 
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the analyst report (N_Associate) to control of the size of the analyst team. Lastly, we include year-
quarter fixed effects (τt), firm fixed effects (μk), and brokerage house fixed effects (ωm) to control 
for other time-invariant, firm-invariant, and brokerage house-invariant factors, respectively. Our 
primary variables of interest are the lead analyst fixed effects (φi) and associate analyst fixed 
effects (ψj). We present a detailed description of the variables in Appendix A.  
Additional dependent variables 
We examine timeliness (Timeliness) as an additional analyst performance metric, defined 
as the cumulative lead time of a forecast divided by the cumulative follow time (Cooper et al. 
2001; Ertimur et al. 2007).  We also use the stock price reaction to the analyst report and the 
abnormal trading volume it generates to proxy for the qualitative information in the report. The 
stock price reaction (AbsCAR) is the absolute value of the three-day cumulative market-adjusted 
abnormal returns around the analyst forecast date.11 Similarly, we follow Cooper et al. (2001) and 
calculate the trading volume reaction (CAV) using the cumulative three-day abnormal stock 
turnover (trading volume divided by shares outstanding). We use the above performance metrics 
as the dependent variables in Equation (1) and augment it with two additional control variables: 
forecast surprise (Surprise) and book-to-market ratio (BTM). All variables are described in 
Appendix A.  
  
                                                            
11 In untabulated tables, we use alternative constructs of abnormal returns benchmarked against the NYSE size-
adjusted returns or calculated using the capital asset-pricing model (CAPM). The results are qualitatively unchanged 
with the alternative measures of stock price reaction. 
14 
 
R2 decomposition 
Our goal is to compare the relative contribution of lead and associate analysts to forecast 
accuracy, timeliness, stock price reaction, and abnormal trading volume. To do so, we compare 
the explanatory power of lead analyst fixed effects to that of associate analyst fixed effects. 
Specifically, we follow Graham et al. (2010) and compare the partial sum of squares attributable 
to all explanatory variables, including the various fixed effects. We present the calculation method 
in Equation (2). To simplify the notation, let yi,k,q denote one of the dependent variables (i.e., 
RankedFEi,k,q, Timelinessi,k,q,n, AbsCARi,k,q,n, or CAVi,k,q,n). Let Xi,k,q denote the vector of all time-
varying control variables. τt, μk, and ωm denote year-quarter, firm, and brokerage house fixed 
effects, respectively; φi and ψj denote lead analyst and associate analyst fixed effects, respectively. 
By definition, the model R2 can be decomposed as follows: 
 
Following Graham et al. (2010), we interpret the above decomposition of the model R2 as 
“the relative power of each factor in reducing the residual sum of squares given that all the other 
factors have been included in the model.” Thus, we report both the covariance values and the 
percentage of the model sum of squares attributed to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. 
  
R2 = cov ቀyi,k,q,n , yොi,k,q,nቁvar ቀyi,k,q,nቁ
= cov ቀyi,k,q,n , Xi,k,q,nβ
෠ + τ̂t + μොk + ωෝm + ϕ෠i + ψෝjቁ
var ቀyi,k,q,nቁ
 
         = cov ቀyi,k,q,n , Xi,k,q,nβ
෠ + τ̂t + μොk + ωෝmቁ
var ቀyi,k,q,nቁ
+ cov൫ϕ
෠
i൯
var ቀyi,k,q,nቁ
+ cov ቀψෝjቁvar ቀyi,k,q,nቁ
                         (2) 
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4. Sample selection 
Obtaining the names of associate analysts 
The names of analysts who contributed to the report are presented on the analyst report in 
the order of contribution. We obtain analyst reports from Thomson ONE. Given the labor-
intensive nature of downloading the reports and hand-collecting the names of the analysts, we 
randomly select two bulge bracket brokerage houses (J.P. Morgan and Bear Stearns) and two 
additional brokerage houses (Oppenheimer and Buckingham). We manually download the 
295,179 analyst reports issued by the four brokerage houses between 2004 and 2014 from 
Thomson ONE. We begin our sample in 2004, after Reg FD and Global Settlement came into 
effect, and end our sample in 2014 because we started collecting the data in 2015. We then code 
the first analyst listed on the analyst report as the lead analyst and the second analyst listed on the 
report as the associate analyst.  
Obtaining the set of variables in the main tests  
We obtain the majority of our variables from the I/B/E/S detail EPS US file and limit the 
sample to all one-quarter-ahead EPS forecasts (i.e., fpi = 6) announced between 2004 and 2014. 
We require the observations to have a forecast announcement date (anndats), forecast value 
(value), forecast period ending date (fpedats), lead analyst identifier (analys), brokerage house 
identifier (estimator), company identifier (ticker), actual earnings announcement date 
(anndats_act), and actual earnings (actual) for both the previous and current firm-quarters.12 To 
control for the analysts’ information set and potential information leakage, we require that the 
EPS forecasts are made after the earnings announcement date for the prior quarter and at least 
                                                            
12 We delete observations where analys=0 since this code is assigned to indicate unidentified analysts. 
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three days before the earnings announcement date for the current quarter. Next, we remove all 
firm-quarters covered by fewer than three analysts since we need multiple analysts to calculate 
ranked measures of forecast accuracy and timeliness (i.e., RankedFE and Timeliness). We append 
variables from the Compustat Fundamental Annual file and the CRSP daily stock file to calculate 
market-based variables (e.g., AbsCAR, CAV, and BTM). To construct industry-based control 
variables (e.g., Spec and B-Ind), we append SIC codes from Compustat. We delete observations 
with unidentified industries and firms in the financial or utilities industries. Our initial sample 
includes 1,085,273 observations, which represent the entire I/B/E/S universe. Upon restricting the 
sample to our four randomly selected brokerage houses, the sample size reduces to 83,283 EPS 
observations, representing 7.7 percent of the entire I/B/E/S universe. 
Merging the hand-collected sample of analyst names with the I/B/E/S database 
We merge the hand-collected dataset of analyst names (lead and associate analysts) with 
the I/B/E/S EPS detail file by the name of the covered firm, the official trading symbol of the 
covered firm, the report issuance date, the last name of the lead analyst, and the name of the 
issuing brokerage house.13 See Appendix B for an example of the matching process. We identify 
and match 63,175 EPS forecasts, which represent 76 percent of the 83,283 EPS forecasts issued 
by the four brokerage houses through I/B/E/S. To separate and compare the impact of lead versus 
associate analysts, we then remove all analyst reports authored by more than one lead analyst or 
by unique combinations of lead and associate analysts. Our final sample for the main tests 
contains 52,078 observations. The final sample covers 927 unique analysts. 193 analysts only 
serve as lead analysts, 170 analysts began as associate analysts and were subsequently promoted 
                                                            
13 The I/B/E/S EPS detail file does not provide analyst and brokerage house names. We obtain lead analyst names 
from the detailed I/B/E/S recommendation file and brokerage house names from the I/B/E/S translation file. 
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to lead analysts, and 564 analysts only serve as associate analysts. Among all analysts in the final 
sample, 199 unique lead analysts have instructed multiple associate analysts. Among all EPS 
forecasts in the final sample, 5,419, 26,946, 12,956 and 6,757 EPS forecasts were issued by Bear 
Stearns, J.P. Morgan, Oppenheimer, and Buckingham, respectively. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 percent level. Appendix C provides details on the sample selection process. 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables in our analyses. 
The mean and median of our primary dependent variable—the percentile ranking of the absolute 
forecast errors, RankedFE—are 49.766 and 50.000, respectively. Since the ranking is conducted 
for the entire I/B/E/S population, the distribution of RankedFE in our sample suggests that our 
sample fairly represents the I/B/E/S population. The mean (median) of our second performance 
measure, EPS forecast timeliness (Timeliness), is 8.169 (1.000). The skewness of the data is 
similar to Eritmur et al.’s (2007) findings.  The mean (median) of the stock price reaction 
(AbsCAR) suggests that, on average, stock prices change by 5.265 percent (3.484 percent) around 
analyst forecast dates. The mean of the abnormal trading volume (CAV) is 2.070, indicating that, 
on average, trading turnover is twice as large during the three-day window around analyst forecast 
dates. The mean (median) number of associate and junior analysts listed on the analyst report is 
1.352 (1.000), suggesting that most analyst reports are authored with the help of one associate 
analyst. Lead analysts in our sample issue, on average, 1.657 forecasts each firm-quarter (Freq).  
Table 1 Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the lead and associate analysts in our 
sample. The sample of lead analysts is larger because some estimates are sole-authored by the 
lead analyst. The length of general experience is 35.493 quarters for lead analysts and 8.300 
quarters for associate analysts. The employment history at the brokerage house is 22.384 quarters 
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for lead analysts (in their role as lead analysts), compared to 7.836 quarters for associate analysts. 
Lead analysts cover, on average, 19.157 firms, while associate analysts cover, on average, 14.314 
firms. These results imply that some lead analysts have multiple associate analysts working 
simultaneously on different firms.  
Table 1 Panel C provides the number of unique lead and associate analysts in our sample 
by year. For brevity, we narrate the results for the entire period. Our sample includes 363 unique 
lead analysts and 734 unique associate analysts. The (untabulated) number of unique lead analysts 
who both work alone and instruct associates is 218. In addition, the (untabulated) number of 
unique lead analysts that work with multiple associate analysts is 199. The significant proportion 
of lead analysts that instruct multiple associate analysts and lead analysts that issue both sole-
authored and co-authored reports is important for differentiating the lead and associate analyst 
fixed effects.  
Lastly, we present the number of observations by brokerage house and year in Panel D. 
Bear Stearns is represented in our sample from 2004 until its bankruptcy and subsequent sale to 
J.P. Morgan Chase in 2008. Note that the number of J.P. Morgan observations did not increase 
following the acquisition of Bear Stearns since most Bear Stearns analysts either left the 
brokerage house or were terminated following the acquisition. 14  Lastly, the number of 
observations for Oppenheimer more than doubled after 2007 due to its acquisition of the US 
operations of CIBC World Markets.15 
  
                                                            
14 See, for example, http://www.integrity-research.com/bear-stearns%E2%80%99-loss-is-other%E2%80%99s-gain/ 
and https://seekingalpha.com/article/79747-no-more-bear-stearns-coverage.  
15 https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/791963/000079196308000001/ex99.htm.  
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5. Results 
The relative contribution of lead analysts and associate analysts to the variation in forecast 
accuracy 
Table 2 reports the results from estimating Eq. (1) to test the relative contribution of lead 
analysts and associate analysts to the variation in forecast accuracy and timeliness. Panel A lists 
the changes in R2 with and without lead or associate analyst fixed effects. Panel B presents the 
coefficient estimates for the control variables. Panel C provides the F-statistics and p-values for 
the lead analyst and associate analyst fixed effects. Lastly, Panel D shows the partial effect of the 
lead and associate analyst fixed effects on total R2. 
Panel A suggests that associate analyst fixed effects improve the explanatory power of the 
model for forecast accuracy. The adjusted R2 of the baseline model is 2.90 percent. Associate 
analyst fixed effects increase the adjusted R2 by 0.90 percent, compared to an increase of 0.70 
percent when including lead analyst fixed effects. Including associate analyst fixed effects in 
addition to lead analyst fixed effects increases the adjusted R2 by 0.60 percent, representing an 
improvement of 16.67 percent (= 0.60 / 3.60) in the model’s explanatory power. We also examine 
the statistical significance of associate analyst fixed effects. F-test statistics in Panel C indicate 
that associate analyst fixed effects are significantly different from zero at the aggregate (F-statistic 
= 1.393, p-value < 0.001). In summary, the results provide initial support that associate analysts 
explain a significant amount of the variation in forecast accuracy. 
Panel D presents the partial contribution of the lead and associate analyst fixed effects to 
the total R2. Following Graham et al. (2010), we decompose and allocate total R2 to lead and 
associate analyst fixed effects. The decomposition shows that lead analyst fixed effects explain 
1.40 percent of the variation in forecast accuracy (12.96 percent of the total R2); while associate 
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analyst fixed effects explain 2.10 percent of the variation in forecast accuracy (19.44 percent of 
the total R2). The last row in Panel D compares the explanatory power of lead analyst fixed effects 
to the explanatory power of associate analyst fixed effects. The value of 0.667 implies that 
associate analyst fixed effects explain 49.90 percent more of the variation in forecast accuracy 
than lead analyst fixed effects do (= 1 / 0.667 – 1). This finding is consistent with our prediction 
that lead analysts delegate the forecasting of earnings to their associate analysts.16 
The relative contribution of lead analysts and associate analysts to the variation in forecast 
timeliness 
Regression results of the relative importance of lead analysts and associate analysts to 
forecast timeliness are reported in column 2 of Table 2. A higher value of Timeliness represents 
more timely estimates. Panel A shows that the adjusted R2 increases by 3.30 percent when we add 
associate analyst fixed effects to the baseline model. Adding associate analyst fixed effects to the 
model with lead analyst fixed effects increases the adjusted R2 by 1.40 percent. F-test statistics in 
Panel D show that both lead and associate analyst fixed effects are statistically different from 
zero, with p-values below 0.001. These results suggest that associate analysts contribute to the 
variation in forecast timeliness.  
Panel D presents the total R2 allocation to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. We 
find that lead analyst fixed effects explain 6.20 percent of the variation in timeliness (24.31 
                                                            
16 Note that our sample is different from prior studies (e.g., Clement 1999 and Jacob et al. 1999) in that we examine 
a subset of four brokerage houses and a different sampling period. The coefficient estimate on Freq is significantly 
positive while Jacob et al. (1999) observe a negative or statistically insignificant coefficient. Our finding is driven 
by the use of all analyst-firm-quarter observations while Jacob et al. (1999) restrict their sample to the last forecast 
of a given analyst for a specific firm-quarter. We deviate from Jacob et al.’s (1999) sample restriction to allow for 
the same sample size across all analyses. It is important for us to maintain a constant sample size across analyses 
since R2 is significantly impacted by sample size. Notwithstanding, in untabulated analyses we restrict the sample to 
the last forecast for a given analyst-firm-quarter. All inferences are qualitatively unchanged, and the coefficient 
estimate on Freq is negative, consistent with the findings of Jacob et al. (1999). 
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percent of total R2) while associate analyst fixed effects explain 3.60 percent of the variation in 
timeliness (14.12 percent of total R2). The results in the last row show that lead analyst fixed 
effects explain 1.722 times as much of the variation in forecast timeliness as associate analyst 
fixed effects do. These results suggest that the decision to issue a forecast is at the discretion of 
the lead analyst. Furthermore, these findings suggest that the higher explanatory power of 
associate analyst fixed effects when the dependent variable is forecast accuracy is not attributed 
to the larger number of associate analyst fixed effects; otherwise we would have observed 
comparable results for forecast timeliness. 
The coefficient estimates are presented in Panel B. The coefficient estimate on forecast 
horizon (Horizon) is 0.042 (t-statistic = 7.38), implying that forecasts issued earlier in the quarter 
are more likely to be timelier. Moreover, the results suggest that forecast timeliness also improves 
with the lead analyst’s firm-specific experience (LnFirmExperience), with a coefficient estimate 
of 0.823 (t-statistic = 5.25). The frequency of analyst reports (Freq) is negatively associated with 
timeliness. This result is expected since most analysts in our sample issue one forecast per firm-
quarter. Therefore, given the definition of forecast timeliness, a follow-up forecast is compared 
to the forecasts at the beginning of the quarter, resulting in a lower timeliness value. Lastly, the 
coefficient estimate on the percentage of analysts joining the brokerage house (PIN) is negative 
and significant. This findings can be explained by either the new analysts that joined the brokerage 
house are not able to issue forecasts in proximity to the prior earnings announcements, or by 
changes to the resource allocation at the brokerage house that affect all analysts at the brokerage 
house. 
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The relative contribution of lead analysts and associate analysts to the variation in stock price 
reaction and abnormal trading volume 
We present the results for the relative contribution of lead analyst and associate analyst 
fixed effects to the variation in stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume in Table 3. Panel 
A compares the model R2s with and without lead or associate analyst fixed effects. For stock price 
reaction (abnormal trading volume), adding associate analyst fixed effects to the baseline 
regression increases the adjusted R2 by 0.70 (0.60) percent. Including associate analyst fixed 
effects in addition to lead analyst fixed effects increases the adjusted R2 by 0.60 (0.50) percent. 
Panel C presents the results for the F-tests that examine the statistical significance of the lead and 
associate analyst fixed effects. The p-values for both the lead analyst fixed effects and associate 
analyst fixed effects are below 0.001 in both columns, implying that both lead analyst fixed effects 
and associate analyst fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in the stock price 
reaction and abnormal trading volume. 
Panel D shows that for stock price reaction (abnormal trading volume), the total R2 
attributed to lead analyst fixed effects is 0.028 (0.032), while the total R2 attributed to associate 
analyst fixed effects is 0.015 (0.011). The bottom row shows that lead analyst fixed effects explain 
86.70 (190.90) percent more of the variation in stock price reaction (abnormal trading volume) 
than associate analyst fixed effects do. In summary, the results in Table 3 suggest that lead 
analysts dominate associate analysts in their contribution to the variation in stock price reaction 
and abnormal trading volume. These results are consistent with our prediction that lead analysts 
are more involved in the qualitative component of analyst reports, as captured by the stock market 
variables. However, our results may also be attributed to the lead analyst’s reputation and 
visibility, which induce more trading volume and a higher price reaction. 
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The moderating effect of firm size on the explanatory power of lead and associate analyst fixed 
effects 
Tables 4A and 4B present the results for testing Hypothesis 3 on the moderating effect of 
firm size on the relative impact of lead and associate analysts on analyst reports. We present the 
number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in each subsample 
in Panel A. Results for the F-tests for lead and associate analyst fixed effects are provided in 
Panel B and the results of the partial effect of lead and associate analyst fixed effects on total R2 
are presented in Panel C. 
We partition the sample by the median market cap at the previous quarter-end date by 
lead-associate analyst pair. We use this cutoff instead of the sample median for two reasons. First, 
analysts may cover only large cap or small cap firms because of industry characteristics or 
analysts’ expertise. Partitioning by lead-associate analyst pairs ensures comparison of firm sizes 
within an analyst’s portfolio rather than across different analyst portfolios. Second, subsampling 
by lead-associate analyst pairs ensures that the same groups of lead and associate analysts are 
included in both subsamples. Consequently, all the columns in tables 4A and 4B include 309 
unique lead analysts and 650 unique associate analysts. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Panel C of Table 4A show that, for forecast accuracy, the explanatory 
power of lead analyst fixed effects is 11.31 percent (19.42 percent) of total R2 for firms with a 
market cap below (above) the median, respectively. The relative contribution of lead analyst fixed 
effects (compared to that of associate analyst fixed effects) for forecast accuracy is 50.00 percent 
larger (= 0.771 / 0.514 – 1) for larger firms. Similarly, for forecast timeliness, columns 3 and 4 
show that the explanatory power of lead analyst fixed effects is 16.50 percent (27.11 percent) of 
total R2 for firms with a market cap below (above) the median, respectively. The relative 
contribution of lead analyst fixed effects (compared to associate analyst fixed effects) for forecast 
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timeliness is 138.10 percent larger (= 1.750 / 0.735 – 1) for larger firms. Panel C of Table 4B 
shows that the explanatory power of lead analyst fixed effects for both stock price reaction and 
abnormal trading volume is higher when the covered firm’s size is larger. Overall, the results in 
Table 4 suggest that lead analysts are more involved in the coverage of firms that are more 
significant to revenue generation at the brokerage house. 
The moderating effect of lead analysts’ firm-specific experience on the explanatory power of 
lead and associate analyst fixed effects 
Tables 5A and 5B report the results for testing Hypothesis 4 on the effect of lead analysts’ 
firm-specific experience on the relative contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects. 
We partition the sample at the median value of the lead analyst’s firm-specific experience by lead-
associate analyst pair. Like the partition on firm size, we subsample by lead-associate analyst pair 
to ensure the same groups of lead and associate analysts appear in both subsamples. Consequently, 
all the analyses include 272 unique lead analysts and 578 unique associate analysts. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Panel C of Table 5A compare the changes in the partial effects of lead 
and associate analyst fixed effects on the total R2. When lead analysts’ firm-specific experience 
is low, lead analyst fixed effects explain 17.65 percent less of the variation in forecast accuracy 
than associate analyst fixed effects do (= 0.028 / 0.034 – 1). However, when lead analysts’ 
experience is above the median, lead analyst fixed effects explain 62.50 percent less of the 
variation in forecast accuracy relative to associate analyst fixed effects (= 0.015 / 0.040 – 1). The 
results in columns 3 and 4 for timeliness and in Table 5B for stock price reaction and abnormal 
trading volume are qualitatively similar. These results suggest that as lead analysts cover a firm 
for a longer period of time, they delegate more tasks to their associates. These results suggest that 
lead analysts are more involved during the initiation a coverage, when significant learning and 
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information processing is required. Over time, as the model improves, lead analysts delegate more 
tasks to the associate analysts. 
The moderating effect of associate analysts’ firm-specific experience on the explanatory power 
of lead and associate analyst fixed effects 
Tables 6A and 6B present the results for testing Hypothesis 5 on the effect of associate 
analysts’ firm-specific experience on the relative contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed 
effects. Since associate analysts’ firm-specific experience is only observed for analyst reports 
authored with associate analysts, we first partition the sample by the median value of the associate 
analyst’s firm-specific experience by lead-associate analyst pair. We then include sole-authored 
reports in both partitions of the sample, when available, to ensure robust identification of lead and 
associate analyst fixed effects. All subsamples in Table 6A and 6B contain 325 unique lead 
analysts and 625 unique associate analysts. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Panel C of Table 6A show a decrease in the partial effects of lead 
relative to associate analyst fixed effects on the total R2 when associate analysts are more 
experienced. When associate analysts’ firm-specifc experience is low, lead analyst fixed effects 
explain 30.00 percent less of the variation in forecast accuracy than associate analyst fixed effects 
do (= 0.021 / 0.030 – 1). When associate analysts’ firm-specific experience is above the median, 
lead analyst fixed effects explain 53.33 percent less of the variation in forecast accuracy relative 
to associate analyst fixed effects (= 0.014 / 0.030 – 1). Columns 3 and 4 indicate that when 
associate analysts’ firm-specific experience is low, lead analyst fixed effects explain 3 times as 
much of the variation in forecast timeliness as explained by associate analyst fixed effects. When 
associate analysts’ experience is above the median, lead analyst fixed effects explain 72.10 
percent more of the variation in forecast timeliness than associate analyst fixed effects do. These 
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results are consistent with our conjecture that lead analysts are more involved in forecasting in 
the early stages of training of associate analysts. We obtain qualitatively similar inferences when 
we examine stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume in Table 6B. 
The moderating effect of forecast timing on the explanatory power of lead and associate analyst 
fixed effects 
Tables 7A and 7B provide the results for testing Hypothesis 6 on the effect of forecast 
timing on the relative explanatory power of lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The sample 
is partitioned by the first and revised forecasts, where the first forecast is defined as the first 
forecast following the earnings announcement for the previous quarter and the revised forecast is 
defined as any forecast revision made after the first forecast and before the earnings 
announcement for the current quarter. Lead-associate pairs who have never issued a revised 
forecast during our sampling period are removed to ensure the same groups of lead and associate 
analysts are included in all subsamples. Thus, all subsamples cover 232 unique lead analysts and 
509 unique associate analysts. 
The results in columns 1 and 2 in Panel C of Table 7A show that the relative contribution 
of lead analyst fixed effects (compared to associate analyst fixed effects) for forecast accuracy 
decreases from 0.667 for the first forecast in the quarter to 0.102 for the revised forecast in the 
quarter. The decline in relative contribution is attributed to a simultaneous decrease in the 
explanatory power of lead analyst fixed effects (from 11.48 percent of total R2 to 2.10 percent of 
total R2) and an increase in the explanatory power of associate analyst fixed effects (from 17.21 
percent of total R2 to 20.63 percent of total R2). Consistent with the decrease in the explanatory 
power of lead analyst fixed effects, the F-statistics in Panel B indicate that lead analyst fixed 
effects are significant for the first forecasts but insignificant for the revised forecasts. These 
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results suggest that lead analysts are more involved in modeling the first forecast in the quarter, 
when more information processing is required. The results are also consistent with lead analysts’ 
increased involvement in tasks that generate more trading commissions since the first forecast in 
the quarter is more informative than the revised forecast (Amiram et al. 2016). Similar to the 
results for forecast accuracy, we find in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7A Panel C that the explanatory 
power of lead analyst fixed effects (compared to that of associate analyst fixed effects) for forecast 
timeliness decreases from 1.488 for the first forecasts to 0.927 for the revised forecasts. The 
results indicate that lead analysts delegate the choice of whether and when to issue the revised 
forecast to the associate analyst, possibly due to the lower importance of the revised forecast 
compared to the first forecast in the quarter. 
Table 7B, Panel C shows that the explanatory power of lead analyst fixed effects relative 
to that of associate analyst fixed effects increases in the revised forecasts. While this result is 
counter-intuitive, a possible explanation for the increase is that lead analysts are busier during the 
earnings announcements season, and they therefore have more time to invest in the qualitative 
aspect of the revised reports. 
6. Additional discussion 
Assortative matching 
A clean identification of lead and associate analysts requires random assignment, i.e., 
associate analysts are randomly assigned to lead analysts. However, such assumptions are not 
attainable in practice as lead analysts usually participate in the interview process of associate 
analysts and have a certain level of freedom to pick associate analysts with whom they want to 
work. In this section, we explain why we do not expect such potential assortative matching 
between lead and associate analysts to affect the interpretation of our results. 
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First, assortative matching between lead and associate analysts may be based on analyst 
competence, e.g., the best-performing lead analysts may have the first pick of the most promising 
associate analysts. To address this kind of assortative matching, in untabulated analyses, we 
include additional controls for associate analysts’ firm experience, the industry specialization of 
associate analysts, and the number of firms covered by associate analysts to capture associate 
analysts’ competence and expertise (the construction of those variables is comparable to the 
construction of lead analyst controls). The inclusion of those associate analyst variables does not 
change the inferences from the results. 
Second, assortative matching between lead and associate analysts can also be based on 
other unobservable traits. For example, lead analysts with specialized industry background (e.g. 
an M.D. degree) may prefer associate analysts with accounting and finance expertise. If a lead 
analyst consistently picks a certain type of associate analysts, the lead analyst fixed effects will 
partially absorb the effects of the common associate analyst traits. In other words, the impact of 
lead analyst fixed effects on analyst reports will be over-estimated and the impact of associate 
analyst fixed effects will be under-estimated. Jointly, the results will be biased towards lead 
analysts. If this bias is large, we will observe a consistently larger partial effects of lead analyst 
fixed effects compared to associate analyst fixed effects on the total R2 for all dependent variables, 
which is not the case for forecast accuracy. Thus, we do not expect this bias to be significant to 
qualitatively alter our inferences from the main results. As for the cross-sectional tests, since we 
include the same groups of lead and associate analysts in the partitioned samples, the assertive 
matching impact, to the extent that it exists, should be similar for both subsamples that we 
compare. Thus, a comparison between the two subsamples eliminates the assortative matching 
effect. 
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Overall, assortative matching can affect the values of each individual partial effects of 
lead and associate analyst fixed effects on the total R2, but we do not expect this issue to materially 
alter the interpretation of our results. 
The validity of fixed-effect estimation 
Fee, Hadlock, and Pierce (2013) discuss the limitations of using fixed effects to identify 
the impact of CEOs’ idiosyncratic-style on firms’ investment and financing decisions, and 
document that CEO fixed effects are falsely significant in a simulated sample. In this section, we 
compare the setting of our paper to the CEO setting and discuss why the limitations that impair 
the validity of fixed effects in their study do not apply in our setting. 
Fee et al. (2013) discuss two major limitations of using CEO fixed effects to identify 
CEO’s idiosyncratic-style on the firm’s investment and financing decisions. First, the 
identification of CEO fixed effects relies on individuals who have served as CEOs in different 
firms. However, CEOs rarely move, and, even if they do move, they usually only move once. 
Further, the rarity of CEO relocation raises concerns that CEO job movers are not representative 
of the CEO population (i.e., only certain types of CEOs move) or that the results are driven by 
confounding factors other than CEOs’ idiosyncratic-style (i.e., CEOs only move under certain 
circumstances). In contrast, our setting has considerably more variation in the coverage of firms 
and authorship of the reports. In our sample, lead analysts and associate analysts cover, on 
average, 19.157 and 14.314 firms, respectively. Further, 85.26 percent of analyst reports are 
issued by lead analysts who have at least sole-authored once during the sample period, and 86.12 
percent of analyst reports are issued by lead analysts who have worked with more than one 
associate analyst. The adequate variation in firm coverage and report authorship allows a more 
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precise identification of firm, lead, and associate analyst fixed effects, and thus our results are 
more representative of the analyst population and less sensitive to potential confounding factors. 
Second, a firm’s investment and financing policies are expected to be highly positively 
serially correlated. Such serial correlation, along with the use of long time-series data and fixed 
effects, can lead to the underestimation of standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 
2004; Fee et al. 2013). In Fee at al.’s (2013) simulated sample, the three factors reinforce each 
other to facilitate a spurious significance of CEO fixed effects, which capture the difference in 
the serial correlation structure of the two firms’ policies rather than the influence of CEOs’ 
idiosyncratic-style. This issue is not material in our setting for two reasons. First, we do not rely 
on the F-tests to examine the significance of lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Instead, we 
focus on the partial effect of lead and associate analyst fixed effects on the total R2, which is not 
impacted by this issue. Second, our sample includes analysts that issue sole-authored reports 
(which is not possible in the CEO setting since it is uncommon for firms to be without a CEO) 
and has significantly more variation because lead and associate analysts cover multiple firms. 
Therefore, the effect of the serial correlation of our dependent variables on the standard errors in 
our setting is likely to be smaller compared to the CEO setting. Overall, we do not expect the 
limitations of the CEO setting to apply to the analyst setting.  
7. Conclusion 
Extant research examines the determinants of analysts’ performance. In those studies, the 
presumption, supported by “star” analyst rankings, is that sell-side equity research is individual. 
However, analysts usually work in hierarchical teams that are led by a senior analyst, who is also 
the “face” of the team. Using a hand-collected sample of analyst teams from four brokerage 
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houses that we obtain from analyst reports, we examine the role of associate analysts in explaining 
lead analysts’ performance. We posit that the division of labor between lead and associate analysts 
follows a “pecking order” where lead analysts focus on higher importance tasks and delegate 
other tasks to associate analysts. 
We find that associate analyst fixed effects explain more of the variation in lead analysts’ 
forecast accuracy than lead analyst fixed effects do. In contrast to our findings for forecast 
accuracy, we document that lead analysts explain more of the variation in forecast timeliness and 
the stock price reaction to analyst reports. These results suggest that EPS forecasting is delegated 
to associate analysts. However, the decision to issue a report, captured by timeliness, and the 
qualitative component of the report, as captures by the stock price reaction and abnormal trading 
volume, are the main responsibility of the lead analyst. These findings are consistent with surveys 
of institutional investors, which suggest that communication skills and industry knowledge are 
more important analyst traits than the quality of earnings estimates. 
In cross-sectional tests, we find that lead analysts are more involved in the coverage of 
large firms. Sell-side equity research generates revenues from trading commissions and larger 
firms typically generate more trading volume. This finding suggests that lead analysts are more 
involved in covering firms that generate more revenues to the brokerage house. We also document 
that lead analysts’ involvement decreases with their firm-specific experience. These results 
suggest that lead analysts are more involved when more expertise and information processing are 
required. Next, we find that lead analysts’ involvement in composing analyst reports and earnings 
estimates decreases with the associate analyst’s firm-specific experience, which suggests that lead 
analysts assign more tasks to associates as the associates become more experienced. Lastly, we 
document that lead analysts are more involved in creating the first forecast in the quarter 
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compared to revised forecasts. These results are consistent with lead analysts’ increased 
involvment in higer importance tasks and when more information processing is required. 
Our study extends the literature by documenting that, despite lead analysts having been 
the focus of extant academic research, associate analysts also play a significant role in forecasting. 
Our findings inform on a major debate in the analyst literature. Despite the extensive research on 
the determinants of forecast accuracy, it is still unclear whether forecast accuracy is important to 
analysts. On the one hand, multiple studies find that low forecast accuracy is associated with 
turnover. On the other hand, additional studies find that forecast accuracy is not associated with 
analyst compensation and “star” status, and surveys of buy-side analysts suggest that forecast 
accuracy is not a primary objective for sell-side analysts. Our study contributes to this debate by 
documenting that lead analysts delegate forecasting to associate analysts. Therefore, while 
forecast accuracy may not be a first-order task for lead analysts, our findings suggest that it may 
be a first-order task for associate analysts. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
RankedFE The percentile ranking of the absolute forecast error among all EPS 
forecasts by each analyst on I/B/E/S for a given firm-quarter. For each 
EPS forecast, we rank the forecast relative to the forecasts of all other 
analysts on I/B/E/S that cover the same firm-quarter. When one of the 
other analysts we use for ranking issues multiple forecasts for a given 
firm-quarter, we only include, for the purpose of ranking, the forecast 
that is made closest in time to the forecast we benchmark. This process 
ensures that only one EPS forecast by each analyst who covers firm k in 
fiscal quarter q is used in constructing the ranked forecast errors. 
Timeliness The sum of the number of days between the forecast announcement date 
and the announcement dates of the two preceding forecasts divided by 
the sum of the number of days between the forecast announcement date 
and the announcement dates of the two subsequent forecasts (Cooper et 
al. 2001, pp. 393-394; Ertimur et al. 2007, p. 583). 
AbsCAR The absolute value of the three-day cumulative market-adjusted 
abnormal returns centered on the analyst forecast announcement date. 
CAV The three-day cumulative abnormal volume around the analyst forecast 
announcement date. Average daily turnover (trading volume divided by 
shares outstanding) for a forecast is estimated during the windows [–81,  
–41] and [41,81] relative to the forecast announcement date. Abnormal 
turnover in a day is computed as the daily turnover on that day over the 
average daily turnover minus 1 (Cooper et al. 2001, pp. 395-396). 
Horizon The number of calendar days between the forecast announcement date 
and the earnings announcement date. 
Freq The number of forecasts issued by the lead analyst for a given firm-
quarter. 
LnFirmExperience The natural logarithm of the number of quarters, including the current 
quarter, the lead analyst has issued forecasts for firm k. 
Spec The number of firms followed by the lead analyst that belong to the 
same industry of firm k divided by the total number of firms followed 
by the lead analyst in year t. 
Comp The number of firms followed by the lead analyst during the year. 
Change An indicator variable that equals 1 when there is a change of the lead 
analyst following the firm at brokerage house m during the quarter; and 
equals 0 otherwise. 
B-Size The percentile ranking of the size of the brokerage house during the 
year, where the size is measured as the number of lead analysts 
employed by the brokerage house. 
B-Ind The number of lead analysts employed by brokerage house m and 
follow firm k’s industry divided by the total number of lead analysts 
employed by brokerage house m during the year. 
PIN The number of lead analysts who joined the brokerage house during the 
calendar year divided by the total number of lead analysts employed by 
the brokerage house during that year. 
POUT The number of lead analysts who left the brokerage house during the 
calendar year divided by the total number of lead analysts employed by 
the brokerage house during that year. 
N_Associate The number of associate and junior analysts listed on the analyst report. 
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Surprise The absolute value of forecast surprise scaled by the closing stock price 
two days prior to the forecast date. The forecast surprise is computed as 
the forecasted value minus the prevailing analyst consensus estimate 
prior to the forecast. Analyst consensus is calculated as the mean of the 
most recent forecasts made by each individual analyst during the 90 
days prior to the forecast announcement date. 
BTM The book-to-market ratio of the covered firm at the previous quarter-
end date. 
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Appendix B: An illustration of the matching between the I/B/E/S file and the analyst report 
An example of an EPS forecast obtained from the I/B/E/S detail EPS file: 
 
 
The last name of the lead-analyst, Horan, is obtained by matching the analyst code from the I/B/E/S detail EPS file with the masked analyst code 
from the I/B/E/S detail stock recommendation file: 
 
 
The name of the brokerage house, Oppenheimer, is obtained from I/B/E/S translation file (legacy): 
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We find the analyst report that corresponds to the EPS forecast by matching the name of the covered firm 
(Verizon), the official trading symbol of the covered firm (VZ), the report issuance date (01/26/2010), the 
last name of the lead analyst (Horan), and the name of the issuing brokerage house (Oppenheimer). 
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Appendix C: Sample selection process 
All one-quarter-ahead EPS forecasts (i.e., fpi = 6) announced 
between 2004 and 2014 with the following data requirements: 
 
  
 Require non-missing forecast announcement date (anndats), 
forecast value (value), forecast period ending date 
(fpedats), lead analyst identifier (analys), brokerage 
house identifier (estimator), and company identifier 
(ticker). 
 
 1,641,732 
 Require non-missing actual earnings announcement date 
(anndats_act) and actual earnings (actual) for both the 
previous and current firm-quarters. 
 
(10,744)  
 Require that the EPS forecasts are made after the earnings 
announcement date for the prior quarter and at least 
three days before the earnings announcement date for 
the current quarter. 
 
(48,252)  
 Require firm-quarters covered by at least three analysts.  (202,654)  
 Require non-missing GVKEY and book value of equity.  (37,757)  
 Require non-missing PERMNO, stock returns, trading volume, 
and market cap. 
 
(2,566)  
 Require a non-missing SIC code and not in the utility or 
financial industries. 
 
(254,486)  
I/B/E/S Universe:   1,085,273 
    
EPS forecasts issued by our four randomly selected brokerage 
houses, i.e., J.P. Morgan, Bear Stearns, Oppenheimer, and 
Buckingham. 
 
 83,283 
 Restrict to analyst reports identified on Thomson ONE.  (20,108)  
 Remove co-lead analyst forecasts.  (6,945)  
 Remove all analyst reports authored by unique combinations of 
lead and associate analysts. 
 
(4,152)  
Final Sample   52,078 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics for the main variables in the regression analyses 
 N Mean Std Dev. P25 P50 P75 
RankedFE 52,078 49.766 30.058 25.000 50.000 75.000 
Timeliness 52,078 8.169 16.150 0.278 1.000 7.500 
AbsCAR 52,078 5.265 5.566 1.475 3.484 7.007 
CAV 52,078 2.070 3.104 0.132 1.312 3.026 
N_Associate 52,078 1.352 0.933 1.000 1.000 2.000 
Horizon 52,078 74.908 28.41 62.000 88.000 91.000 
Freq 52,078 1.657 0.903 1.000 1.000 2.000 
LnFirmExperience 52,078 2.425 1.044 1.792 2.565 3.219 
Spec 52,078 55.716 32.094 25.000 57.143 86.667 
Comp 52,078 19.157 7.265 14.000 18.000 23.000 
Change 52,078 0.030 0.172 0.000 0.000 0.000 
B-Size 52,078 94.290 6.405 91.000 98.000 99.000 
B-Ind 52,078 11.600 8.746 4.255 9.559 17.544 
PIN 52,078 21.077 12.088 14.754 20.561 24.528 
POUT 52,078 22.418 10.827 16.964 20.000 24.528 
Surprise 52,078 0.069 6.940 0.000 0.001 0.003 
BTM 52,078 0.525 0.538 0.255 0.406 0.640 
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Panel B: Experience (in quarters) and the number of firms covered by lead and associate analysts 
 N Mean Std Dev. P25 P50 P75 
Lead analysts (all EPS forecasts):       
General experience 52,078 35.493 19.659 22 33 47 
Firm experience 52,078 17.472 15.033 6 13 25 
Employment history at the brokerage house 52,078 22.384 15.793 10 20 30 
Number of firms covered 52,078 19.157 7.265 14 18 23 
Associate analysts (EPS forecasts issued with an associate):       
General experience 42,626 8.300 7.057 3 6 11 
Firm experience 42,626 5.488 5.243 2 4 7 
Employment history at the brokerage house 42,626 7.836 6.656 3 6 10 
Number of firms covered 42,626 14.314 6.015 10 14 18 
 
Panel C: Number of unique lead and associate analysts by year 
Year Number of unique lead analysts Number of unique associate analysts 
2004 170 204 
2005 160 216 
2006 166 218 
2007 166 226 
2008 174 245 
2009 110 139 
2010 109 166 
2011 103 145 
2012 95 138 
2013 94 141 
2014 92 145 
2004-2014 363 734 
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Panel D: Number of observations by brokerage house and year   
 Total Bear Stearns J.P. Morgan Buckingham Oppenheimer 
2004 4,952 1,378 2,247 725 602 
2005 5,096 1,338 2,571 586 601 
2006 4,739 708 2,625 689 717 
2007 5,401 1,405 2,644 626 726 
2008 6,078 590 3,015 836 1,637 
2009 4,792 0 2,457 666 1,669 
2010 4,629 0 2,337 603 1,689 
2011 4,128 0 2,222 585 1,321 
2012 4,114 0 2,280 552 1,282 
2013 4,102 0 2,270 451 1,381 
2014 4,047 0 2,278 438 1,331 
2004-2014 52,078 5,419 26,946 6,757 12,956 
Notes: Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the main variables we use in the regression 
analyses. Panel B provides the descriptive statistics for lead analysts and associate analysts. The 
sample size of lead analysts is larger since they sometimes publish sole-authored reports. Panel C 
describes the number of unique lead and associate analysts in our sample, by year. Panel D reports 
the sample composition by brokerage house and year. Variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 2: The role of associate and lead analysts in explaining the variation in forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Panel A: Incremental R2 
  Incremental R2 
Regression: Adjusted R2 Unadjusted R2  Adjusted Unadjusted 
(1) Dependent Variable: RankedFE      
 (a) no analyst FE 2.90% 7.50%    
 (b) with lead analyst FE 3.60% 8.90% (b) - (a) 0.70% 1.40% 
 (c) with associate analyst FE 3.80% 9.80% (c) - (a) 0.90% 2.30% 
 (d) with lead analyst FE and associate analyst FE 4.20% 10.80% (d) - (b) 0.60% 1.90% 
 
(2) Dependent Variable: Timeliness      
 (a) no analyst FE 15.90% 20.00%    
 (b) with lead analyst FE 18.60% 23.00% (b) - (a) 2.70% 3.00% 
 (c) with associate analyst FE 19.20% 24.20% (c) - (a) 3.30% 4.20% 
 (d) with lead analyst FE and associate analyst FE 20.00% 25.50% (d) - (b) 1.40% 2.50% 
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Panel B: Regression estimation 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: RankedFE Timeliness 
Horizon 0.086*** 0.042*** 
 (13.03) (7.38) 
Freq 2.164*** –0.266** 
 (6.12) (–2.58) 
LnFirmExperience –0.168 0.823*** 
 (–0.65) (5.25) 
Spec 0.007 0.019** 
 (0.44) (2.50) 
Comp –0.107 0.103*** 
 (–1.49) (2.69) 
Change 0.695 –1.011** 
 (0.76) (–2.14) 
B-Size –0.238 0.129 
 (–1.50) (1.14) 
B-Ind –0.034 –0.002 
 (–0.53) (–0.06) 
PIN –0.013 –0.029** 
 (–0.54) (–2.40) 
POUT 0.025 0.001 
 (1.15) (0.05) 
N_Associate 0.313 0.203 
  (0.75) (1.01) 
   
Quarter-Year FE, broker FE, firm FE Yes Yes 
Lead analyst FE Yes Yes 
Associate analyst FE Yes Yes 
   
Clustered Standard Errors Lead Analyst Lead Analyst 
   
R2 0.108 0.255 
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.200 
   
N(observations) 52,078 52,078 
N(lead analysts) 363 363 
N(associate analysts) 734 734 
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Panel C: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.502 2.344 
p(lead analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.393 2.174 
p(associate analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 
 
Panel D: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in forecast 
accuracy and timeliness 
Lead analyst FE 0.014 0.062 
 (12.96%) (24.31%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.021 0.036 
 (19.44%) (14.12%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 0.667 1.722 
Notes: Panel A presents the changes in model R2 when including lead and/or associate analyst fixed 
effects in Eq. (1). Panel B reports the coefficient estimation of Eq. (1). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels (two-
sided) of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Panel C reports the F-statistics of lead 
and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel D reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well 
as the fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed 
effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 3: The role of associate and lead analysts in explaining the variation in stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume 
around the forecast announcement date 
Panel A: Incremental R2 
  Incremental R2 
Regression: Adjusted R2 Unadjusted R2  Adjusted Unadjusted 
(1) Dependent Variable: AbsCAR      
 (a) no analyst FE 22.30% 26.10%    
 (b) with lead analyst FE 22.70% 26.90% (b) - (a) 0.40% 0.80% 
 (c) with associate analyst FE 23.00% 27.80% (c) - (a) 0.70% 1.70% 
 (d) with lead analyst FE and associate analyst FE 23.30% 28.50% (d) - (b) 0.60% 1.60% 
 
(2) Dependent Variable: CAV      
 (a) no analyst FE 14.80% 18.90%    
 (b) with lead analyst FE 15.10% 19.70% (b) - (a) 0.30% 0.80% 
 (c) with associate analyst FE 15.40% 20.60% (c) - (a) 0.60% 1.70% 
 (d) with lead analyst FE and associate analyst FE 15.60% 21.40% (d) - (b) 0.50% 1.70% 
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Panel B: Regression estimation 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable: AbsCAR CAV 
Surprise 0.008*** –0.000 
 (7.93) (–0.16) 
BTM 0.800*** –0.098 
 (5.13) (–1.51) 
Horizon 0.017*** 0.012*** 
 (12.81) (13.32) 
Freq –0.003 0.037 
 (–0.10) (1.60) 
LnFirmExperience 0.155*** 0.103*** 
 (3.77) (4.38) 
Spec 0.001 0.000 
 (0.30) (0.35) 
Comp –0.004 –0.005 
 (–0.33) (–0.62) 
Change –0.745*** –0.621*** 
 (–4.56) (–5.86) 
B-Size 0.001 0.011 
 (0.03) (0.79) 
B-Ind –0.018** –0.006 
 (–2.28) (–1.03) 
PIN –0.007 –0.001 
 (–1.57) (–0.47) 
POUT –0.002 –0.000 
 (–0.63) (–0.00) 
N_Associate –0.010 0.001 
  (–0.14) (0.03) 
   
Quarter-Year FE, broker FE, firm FE Yes Yes 
Lead analyst FE Yes Yes 
Associate analyst FE Yes Yes 
   
Clustered Standard Errors Lead Analyst Lead Analyst 
   
R2   
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.214 
 0.233 0.156 
N(observations) 52,078 52,078 
N(lead analysts) 363 363 
N(associate analysts) 734 734 
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Panel C: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.470 1.395 
p(lead analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.503 1.421 
p(associate analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 
 
Panel D: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in stock 
price reaction and abnormal trading volume around the forecast announcement date 
Lead analyst FE 0.028 0.032 
 (9.82%) (14.95%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.015 0.011 
 (5.26%) (5.14%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 1.867 2.909 
Notes: Panel A presents the changes in model R2 when including lead and/or associate analyst fixed 
effects in Eq. (1). Panel B reports the coefficient estimation of Eq. (1). All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance levels (two-
sided) of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. Panel C reports the F-statistics of lead 
and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel D reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well 
as the fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed 
effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in parentheses.  
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Table 4A: The moderating effect of the covered firm’s size for forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Panel A: Observations and analyst count 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Covered Firm Market Cap: Low High Low High 
Dependent Variable: RankedFE RankedFE Timeliness Timeliness 
N(observations) 24,277 24,280 24,277 24,280 
N(lead analysts) 309 309 309 309 
N(associate analysts) 650 650 650 650 
Panel B: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.300 1.338 1.764 1.812 
p(lead analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.240 1.219 1.570 1.802 
p(associate analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Lead analyst FE 0.019 0.027 0.050 0.077 
 (11.31%) (19.42%) (16.50%) (27.11%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.037 0.035 0.068 0.044 
 (22.02%) (25.18%) (22.44%) (15.49%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 0.514 0.771 0.735 1.750 
Notes: Panel A presents the number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in the estimation of Eq. (1). Panel B 
reports the F-statistics for the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel C reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well as the fractions 
of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4B: The moderating effect of the covered firm’s size for stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume around the forecast 
announcement date 
Panel A: Observations and analyst count 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Covered Firm Market Cap: Low High Low High 
Dependent Variable: AbsCAR AbsCAR CAV CAV 
N(observations) 24,277 24,280 24,277 24,280 
N(lead analysts) 309 309 309 309 
N(associate analysts) 650 650 650 650 
Panel B: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.232 1.602 1.036 1.594 
p(lead analyst FE) 0.004 <0.001 0.322 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.070 1.367 1.201 1.299 
p(associate analyst FE) 0.108 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume around 
the forecast announcement date 
Lead analyst FE 0.019 0.066 0.019 0.074 
 (6.27%) (20.31%) (7.82%) (27.51%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.024 0.011 0.028 0.005 
 (7.92%) (3.38%) (11.52%) (1.86%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 0.792 6.000 0.679 14.800 
Notes: Panel A presents the number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in the estimation of Eq. (1). Panel B 
reports the F-statistics for the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel C reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well as the fractions 
of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5A: The moderating effect of the lead analyst’s firm-specific experience for forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Panel A: Observations and analyst count 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lead Analyst Firm-Specific Experience: Low High Low High 
Dependent Variable: RankedFE RankedFE Timeliness Timeliness 
N(observations) 20,652 20,652 20,652 20,652 
N(lead analysts) 272 272 272 272 
N(associate analysts) 578 578 578 578 
Panel B: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.400 1.137 1.534 1.930 
p(lead analyst FE) <0.001 0.062 <0.001 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.167 1.241 1.562 1.830 
p(associate analyst FE) 0.004 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Lead analyst FE 0.028 0.015 0.061 0.064 
 (14.58%) (7.89%) (18.77%) (17.63%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.034 0.040 0.036 0.066 
 (17.71%) (21.05%) (11.08%) (18.18%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 0.824 0.375 1.694 0.970 
Notes: Panel A presents the number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in the estimation of Eq. (1). Panel B 
reports the F-statistics for the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel C reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well as the fractions 
of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5B: The moderating effect of the lead analyst’s firm-specific experience for stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume 
around the forecast announcement date 
Panel A: Observations and analyst count 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lead Analyst Firm-Specific Experience: Low High Low High 
Dependent Variable: AbsCAR AbsCAR CAV CAV 
N(observations) 20,652 20,652 20,652 20,652 
N(lead analysts) 272 272 272 272 
N(associate analysts) 578 578 578 578 
Panel B: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.129 1.396 1.395 1.354 
p(lead analyst FE) 0.072 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.079 1.450 1.317 1.294 
p(associate analyst FE) 0.095 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume around 
the forecast announcement date 
Lead analyst FE 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.020 
 (8.43%) (7.16%) (9.54%) (6.06%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.003 0.025 0.022 0.023 
 (0.84%) (6.39%) (6.77%) (6.97%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 10.000 1.120 1.409 0.870 
Notes: Panel A presents the number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in the estimation of Eq. (1). Panel B 
reports the F-statistics for the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel C reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well as the fractions 
of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6A: The moderating effect of the associate analyst’s firm-specific experience for forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Panel A: Observations and analyst count 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Associate Analyst Firm Experience: Low High Low High 
Dependent Variable: RankedFE RankedFE Timeliness Timeliness 
N(observations) 27,272 27,272 27,272 27,272 
N(lead analysts) 325 325 325 325 
N(associate analysts) 625 625 625 625 
Panel B: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.549 1.298 2.167 2.040 
p(lead analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.194 1.265 1.643 1.849 
p(associate analyst FE) 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Lead analyst FE 0.021 0.014 0.087 0.074 
 (12.65%) (8.64%) (29.00%) (23.05%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.030 0.030 0.029 0.043 
 (18.07%) (18.52%) (9.67%) (13.40%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 0.700 0.467 3.000 1.721 
Notes: Panel A presents the number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in the estimation of Eq. (1). Panel B 
reports the F-statistics for the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel C reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well as the fractions 
of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6B: The moderating effect of the associate analyst’s firm-specific experience in explaining the variation in stock price reaction 
and abnormal trading volume around the forecast announcement date 
Panel A: Observations and analyst count 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Associate Analyst Firm Experience: Low High Low High 
Dependent Variable: AbsCAR AbsCAR CAV CAV 
N(observations) 27,272 27,272 27,272 27,272 
N(lead analysts) 325 325 325 325 
N(associate analysts) 625 625 625 625 
Panel B: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.424 1.609 1.694 1.889 
p(lead analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.224 1.544 1.497 1.600 
p(associate analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume around 
the forecast announcement date 
Lead analyst FE 0.034 0.019 0.067 0.010 
 (10.21%) (5.51%) (24.28%) (3.52%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.022 0.028 0.015 0.040 
 (6.61%) (8.12%) (5.43%) (14.08%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 1.545 0.679 4.467 0.250 
Notes: Panel A presents the number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in the estimation of Eq. (1). Panel B 
reports the F-statistics for the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel C reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well as the fractions 
of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7A: The moderating effect of forecast timing for forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Panel A: Observations and analyst count 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forecast Timing: First Revised First Revised 
Dependent Variable: RankedFE RankedFE Timeliness Timeliness 
N(observations) 35,233 9,788 35,233 9,788 
N(lead analysts) 232 232 232 232 
N(associate analysts) 509 509 509 509 
Panel B: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.329 1.092 2.718 1.379 
p(lead analyst FE) 0.001 0.165 <0.001 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.287 1.123 2.250 1.287 
p(associate analyst FE) <0.001 0.033 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in forecast accuracy and timeliness 
Lead analyst FE 0.014 0.006 0.064 0.051 
 (11.48%) (2.10%) (21.48%) (14.13%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.021 0.059 0.043 0.055 
 (17.21%) (20.63%) (14.43%) (15.24%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 0.667 0.102 1.488 0.927 
Notes: Panel A presents the number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in the estimation of Eq. (1). Panel B 
reports the F-statistics for the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel C reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well as the fractions 
of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 7B: The moderating effect of forecast timing for stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume around the forecast 
announcement date 
Panel A: Observations and analyst count 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Forecast Timing: First Revised First Revised 
Dependent Variable: AbsCAR AbsCAR CAV CAV 
N(observations) 35,233 9,788 35,233 9,788 
N(lead analysts) 232 232 232 232 
N(associate analysts) 509 509 509 509 
Panel B: F-test statistics for lead and associate analyst FE 
F(lead analyst FE) 1.169 1.825 1.208 2.013 
p(lead analyst FE) 0.040 <0.001 0.017 <0.001 
F(associate analyst FE) 1.268 1.425 1.308 1.780 
p(associate analyst FE) <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
Panel C: The contribution of lead and associate analyst fixed effects to the variation in stock price reaction and abnormal trading volume around 
the forecast announcement date 
Lead analyst FE 0.019 0.098 0.008 0.153 
 (6.13%) (20.08%) (3.10%) (28.44%) 
Associate analyst FE 0.019 0.026 0.022 0.008 
 (6.13%) (5.33%) (8.53%) (1.49%) 
Lead analyst FE/Associate analyst FE 1.000 3.769 0.364 19.125 
Notes: Panel A presents the number of observations and the number of lead and associate analysts included in the estimation of Eq. (1). Panel B 
reports the F-statistics for the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. Panel C reports the values of the partial sum of squares as well as the fractions 
of the model sum of squares attributable to the lead and associate analyst fixed effects. The fractions of the model sum of squares are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
 
